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THE JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
UNDER THE ACT OF FEBRUARY 13, 1925
WLIum HOWARD TAFT
I am asked by the Editor of this Journal to say something about
the recent Act of Congress of February 13th last, amending the
statutes controlling the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court and of the Circuit Courts of Appeals of the United States.
Satisfactory expositions of the Act, with detailed reference to its
sections, have been given by Mr. Charles W. Bunn in the Minne-
sota Law Review," and in the West Publishing Company's Docket
for April, 1925; by Mr. Paxton Blair in the Columbia Law
Review in the April number of this year ;2 by U. S. District Judge
Trieber, of Arkansas, in an address to the Bar Association of
that State; and by others. I shall only attempt to point out its
broad purpose and its general effect, without section citation.
At the centenary celebration of the launching of the Federal
Constitution in Philadelphia, the addresses of the Justices of
the Supreme Court and of the distinguished members of the Bar
contained urgent appeals to Congress to relieve the Court, which
was then considerably more than three years behind.
Congress sought to remove the congestion by the Act of March
3d, 1891.3 It created nine Circuit Courts of Appeals as inter-
mediate courts of review. The parliamentary situation with
respect to the bill had been such that if a measure of that kdnd
was to pass in the last days of the 50th Congress, it had to pass
exactly as it was reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee.
It was not, therefore, subjected to as full and free discussion as
was desirable, and was not freed from gaps and obscurities which
more careful consideration would have avoided. The Supreme
Court in its interpretation has had difficulty in clarifying it.
In the Act of 1891, Congress for the first time conferred upon
the Supreme Court, in extensive classes of litigation, discretion
1 (1925) 9" MINN. L. REv. 309.
2 (1925) 25 Cor- L. REv. 393.
3 26 STAT. AT. L. 826.
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to decline to review cases if they did not seem to the Court to be
worthy of further review. In this discretionary jurisdiction the
most numerous class of cases was of those which depended upon
the diverse citizenship of the parties as the basis of federal juris-
diction. Patent cases, copyright cases, Federal trade-mark cases,
admiralty cases, revenue cases, criminal cases, and most bank-
ruptcy cases were similarly dealt with either in the original Act or
by amendments. A review in them was given in the nine ,Cir-
cuit Courts of Appeals. Their disposition by those courts was
thus made final, unless they were removed by the discretionary
writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.
The Circuit Courts of Appeals worked well. Speaking gener-
ally, they were always abreast of their dockets, and their activity
soon removed the "hump" in the docket of the Supreme Court.
After thirty-five years, however, that Court's business had again
grown beyond its capacity, and a hearing could not be had for
cases not advanced out of their order until more than a year after
their filing. The members of the Court, afraid that the docket
might become more congested, brought the matter to the attention
of the Judiciary Committees of both Houses of Congress, and it
was there suggested that the Court prepare a bill to help matters.
A committee of the Court was appointed, of which Mr. Justice
Day was Chairman, Mr. Justice Van Devanter and Mr. Justice
McReynolds were members, and the Chief Justice acted ex officio.
Upon the retirement of Mr. Justice Day, Mr. Justice Van Devan-
ter became the Chairman of the Committee. In the pressure of
the regular judicial work, the bill was not fully and satisfactorily
formulated until the last session of the first Congress in the Hard-
ing Administration. Its legislative consideration was delayed
by measures regarded as more pressing until the last session of
the last Congress.
The chief agency employed in the new Act to accomplish its
purpose is the enlargement of the classes of cases which must
stand the preliminary test of an application for a writ of certio-
rari before they can be reviewed by the Court, i. e. by trans-
ferring more cases from the obligatory to the discretionary jur-
isdiction than as provided in the Act of 1891 and its amendments.
The sound theory of that Act and of the new Act is that liti-
gants have their rights sufficiently protected by a hearing or trial
in the courts of first instance, and by one review in an immediate
appellate Federal court. The function of the Supreme Court is
conceived to be, not the remedying of a particular litigant's wrong,
but the consideration of cases whose decision involves principles,
the application of which are of wide public or governmental inter-
est, and which should be authoritatively declared by the final
court. Such cases should include issues of the Federal constitu-
tional validity of statutes, Federal and State, genuine issues of
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constitutional right of individuals, the interpretation of Federal
statutes when it will affect large classes of people, questions of
Federal jurisdiction, and sometimes doubtful questions of gen-
eral law of such wide application that the Supreme Court may
help to remove the doubt. Where there is a conflict of opinion
between intermediate appellate courts in the different Circuits
or between the federal intermediate appellate courts and the
Supreme Courts of the States, the public interest certainly re-
quires that the Supreme Court hear the cases, if its decision will
remove the conflict.
The Court has thought it wise to indicate the lines along which
its discretion will be exercised in granting certioraris, in Par. 5 of
Rule 35 of the new Rules adopted by the Court in June last, to
square with the new Act.
4
The number of applications for certiorari is much greater than
it should be. It is natural, I suppose, that a defeated party should
seek to exhaust every remedy in a case of great personal im-
portance and should pay little heed to the indispensable con-
ditions of our granting the writ. But counsel are charged
with a greater sense of responsibility in the matter. They should
know whether cases involve issues putting them within the class
in which certiorari is possible or probable. If not, it is their
duty to the Court to save it from useless labor, and to their
clients to save them from the heavy and useless expense of get-
ting the record and preparing and printing the petition and
brief. Easily one-half of the certiorari applications now pre-
sented have no justification at all. It sometimes happens, I hope
4 Par. 5 is as follows:
"5. A review on writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of
sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only where there are special
and important reasons therefor. The following, while neither controlling
nor fully measuring the court's discretion, indicate the character of rea-
sons which will be considered:
(a) Where a state court has decided a federal question of substance
not theretofore determined by this court, or has decided it in a vay
probably not in accord with applicable decisions of this court.
(b) Where a circuit court of appeals has rendered a decision in con-
flict with the decision of another circuit court of appeals on the same
matter; or has decided an important question of local law in a way
probably in conflict with applicable local decisions; or has decided an
important question of general law in a way probably untenable or in
conflict with the weight of authority; or has decided an important ques-
tion of federal law which has not been, but should be, settled by this
court; or has decided a federal question in a way probably in conflict
with applicable decisions of this court; or has so far departed from the
accepted and usual course of Judicial proceedin!Ts, or so far sanctioneOl
such a departure by a lower court, as to call'for an exercise of this
court's power of supervision.
(c) Where the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia has de-
cided a question of general importance, or a question of substance re-
lating to the construction or application of the Constitution, or a treat,
or statute, of the United States, which has not been, but should be,
settled by this court; or where that court has not given proper effect to
an applicable decision of this court."
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not frequently, that application for the writ is made merely to
secure delay. A lawyer who deliberately lends himself to such
a purpose is guilty of conduct calling at least for the censure of
the court, and he and his client may well incur a heavier penalty.
In most cases which the Supreme Court is given the power
and discretion to review by certiorari, the new Act gives the
judges of the lower court authority to certify relevant questions
arising to the Supreme Court. This is another form of review,
not granted the parties, but had at the option of the judges of
the lower court. This method of review in the Supreme Court
obtained under the prior law in cases in the Circuit Courts of
Appeals and in the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia.
The addition to the cases now made subject to review in the
Circuit Courts of Appeals may increase the frequency of the use
of certification somewhat. Under the present Act, the Court of
Claims, which could not do so before, may certify questions.
Under the new Act, the Supreme Court may ultimately review
the judgments or decrees of all inferior courts created by Con-
gress as fully as under previous legislation; but it can exercise
under the new Act no direct and immediate review either by
error, appeal, or certiorari over either the Supreme Court of the
District of Columbia or its inferior, Courts, the U. S. District
Court of Alaska, the Supreme Court of Porto Rico, the United
States District Court of Porto Rico, the Court of the Panama
Canal Zone, the Circuit Court of the United States for China or
the District Court for the Virgin Islands. Their judgments or
decrees the Supreme Court can examine only after they have
been first reviewed and passed upon by the Court of Appeals of
the District of Columbia, or by the proper Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, and then only by certiorari.
The courts whose judgments, decrees, orders and proceedings
the Supreme Court may review directly are:
First. The nine Circuit Courts of Appeals and the Court of
Appeals of the District of Columbia.
Second. The courts of last resort of the several states.
Third. The District Courts of the United States.
Fourth. The Court of Claims.
Fifth. The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands.
Sixth. The Court of Customs Appeals.
Let us consider by what procedure this direct review may be
had under each of these heads.
First. The general method of review of cases from the Cir-
cuit Courts of Appeals or from the Court of Appeals of the Dis-
trict of Columbia by the Supreme Court is at the discretion of
the Supreme Court by certiorari, or at the discretion of the
Judges of the lower court by their certification to the Supreme
Court of relevant questions arising in the case. The certiorari
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in such cases may be applied for before or after final judgment
or decree; but if before, it must be applied for before submission
of the cases to the lower court.
The only exception to this general rule is in a narrow class
of cases in which the validity of a state statute is questioned
as violating the Constitution or a treaty or statute of the United
States, and the decision of the lower court is against its validity.
in such a case, a writ of error or appeal from the intermediate
appellate court lies to the Supreme Court, but the consideration
of the reviewing court in such review is limited to the Federal
question. Should the defeated party desire to have the whole
case examined on its merits, he can only secure this by abandon-
ing his right to an appeal or writ of error and by invoking the
discretion of the Supreme Court by applying for a writ of certi-
orari.
Second. In cases of final judgment or decree of a court of
last resort of a state involving a federal question and thus per-
mitting review by the Supreme Court of the United States, re-
view can be had only in the discretion of the Supreme Court and
by the granting of a certiorari, except in two classes of cases in
which a writ of error lies. The first is where the validity under
the Federal Constitution of a treaty or statute of the United
States is questioned and the decision is against its validity; and
the second is where the validity of a statute of a state under the
Federal Constitution, treaty or law is questioned and the deci-
sion is in favor of its validity. There is no review provided for
by certification of questions by the judges of the state court to
the Supreme Court.
Third. There is no review of the judgments or orders of the
District Courts of the United States by writ of certiorari from
the Supreme Court. There are, however, three instances in
which there is obligatory review by appeals from d eees of the
District Courts, and one instance by writ of error to a judgment
of the District Court. The appeals are-first from decrees in
suits in equity brought by the United States to restrain viola-
tions of the Anti-Trust or Interstate ohmirce Acts; second,
from decrees in suits in equity brbugM !*e9btain interlocutory
or final injunctions to prevent the enfd~ement of a statute
of a state, or of an order made by an administrative Board
or Commission of the "state; and, third, from decrees in
suits in equity to enjoin enforcement of orders of the Interstate
Commerce Commission other than for the payment of money.
These three classes of appeals are distinguished by the fact that
the orders or decrees to be appealed from can only be granted
by what is called a three-judge court, a court which must have
at least one Circuit Judge or Justice in its composition. The
basis for these exceptions is that as the District Court is thus
YALE LAW JOURNAL
constituted of at least three judges who might constitute a Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, it is to be ranked with that court in the
weight to be given its conclusions. It perhaps might have been
better in the interest of uniformity to have subjected these re-
views to the test of an application for certiorari rather than to
give them an obligatory character; but their special govern-
mental or public importance prevailed to make them exceptions.
The only writ of error permitted from the Supreme Court to
a District Court is in criminal cases in which the United States
has been defeated by a ruling of the District Court, and where
the defendant has not been exposed to jeopardy or acquitted by
a verdict of the jury. The reason for this exception is doubtless
in the need for expedition in securing a final construction of new
criminal statutes by the court of last resort, so that the Govern-
ment and those charged with violating the new law may have the
earliest possible final interpretation of what the law means, and
long trials and convictions, which might subsequently be set aside
because of a faulty interpretation of the statute, may be avoided.
Expedition and uniformity in construction are thus the control-
ling considerations.
In no other cases and in no other mode than as above stated
is there any direct review of district courts by the Supreme
Court. It can only be reached in other cases from those courts
through the proper Circuit Court of Appeals by certiorari.
Fourth. All cases from the Court of Claims are to be re-
viewed by the Supreme Court by certiorari at the option of the
Supreme Court, or by certificate of relevant questions by the
Judges of the Court of Claims, and not otherwise.
Fifth. By this Act, any final judgment or decree of the Su-
preme Court of the Philippines, wherein the Constitution or any
statute or treaty of the United States is involved, or where the
value of any controversy exceeds $25,000, may be reviewed only
by certiorari from the Supreme Court of the United States, and
there is no power in the Philippine Court to certify questions.
Sixth. By Section 195 of the Judicial Code, amended in 1914,
38 Stat. 703, ch. 267, final judgments or decrees in the Court of
Customs Appeals may upon petition of either party in cases in
which the construction of the Federal Constitution or a treaty
is involved, or in other cases upon certificate of expediency by
the Attorney General, be examined on certiorari by the Supreme
Court. Cases in the Court of Customs Appeals are the only
ones in the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court not re-
ferred to and described in the new Act. The method of review
in such cases is by certiorari, and there is no power given the
Judges of the lower court to certify questions to the Supreme
Court.
I have now recounted in the foregoing the entire appellate
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in review of the judgments
of other courts. It does not of course include proceedings which
in the docket of the Court are marked as original suits but which
are incidental to its appellate jurisdiction. I refer to applica-
tions for writs of mandamus, quo warranto, prohibition and
habeas corpus, which are directly brought in the Supreme Court,
but are merely in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. The really
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court includes only cases
affecting Ambassadors and other public ministers and consuls
and those in which a state is a party, a jurisdiction which
Congress may neither enlarge nor diminish, and which needs
no congressional legislation to give it effect.
The number of cases of obligatory appellate jurisdiction con-
ferred on the Supreme Court previous to the new Act, and which
is now taken away by it, could be stated with fair approximation
by a detailed classification of the cases heard and disposed of by
the Court in the last three or four years, but I have not the rec-
ords at hand to make such a statement. Without it, one can not
be sure by how many cases the new Act will enable the Court to
reduce its docket. A short resume of the classes of cases trans-
ferred from the Court's obligatory jurisdiction under the pre-
vious law to its certiorari jurisdiction under the new Act may
give some general idea of its effect in this regard.
1st. Under the prior law, cases in the District Courts pre-
senting questions of jurisdiction alone, involving the construc-
tion or application of the Federal Constitution or of a Federal
treaty, prize cases, suits on claims against the United States for
not exceeding $10,000 under what is known as the Tucker Act,
-could be directly carried to the Supreme Court by appeal. By
the new Act all of these cases are now subject to review by the
Circuit Courts of Appeals, and thence are reviewable only by
certiorari or certificate in the Supreme Court.
2nd. The Judicial Code shows twenty-five classes of civil
suits cognizable by the District Courts of the United States
which if involving in value $1000 are reviewable by the Circuit
Court of Appeals. They embrace suits so rarely brought as to
be regarded as nearly obsolete, as, for instance, suits arising
under any law relating to the slave trade. On the other hand,
they do include civil suits of more frequent occurrence. The
more important of them are as follows:
1st, suits brought by the United States or by any officer thereof
authorized by law to sue;
2nd, suits between citizens of the same state claiming lands
under grants from different states;
3rd, suits arising under the Constitution or laws or treaties
of the United States where more than $3,000 is involved (pre-
sumably a considerable class).
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4th, seizures on land or waters not within admiralty or mari-
time jurisdiction.
5th, cases arising under the postal laws.
6th, suits and proceedings under any law regulating commerce,
except such as may be governed by special statutes already men-
tioned.
7th, civil suits and proceedings for enforcement of penalties
and forfeitures incurred under any law of the United States.
8th, suits for damages by officers and persons for injury done
them in protection or collection of the United States revenue or
to enforce rights of citizens to vote.
9th, suits for damages by citizens injured in their federal
constitutional rights.
10th, suits against consuls and vice-consuls.
11th, suits under immigration and contract labor laws.
12th, private suits under the Anti Trust Act.
13th, suits by Indians or part blood Indians for allotment
under any law or treaty.
14th, suits by tenants in common or joint tenants for parti-
tion of land, in which the United States is also a tenant in com-
mon or joint tenant.
Under the prior law, such cases, if they involved more than
$1000 in amount, if not suits solely dependent upon the diverse
citizenship of the parties for the Federal jurisdiction, or if not
classed as arising under the patent, trade-mark, copyright, rev-
enue, criminal or admiralty laws, were in the obligatory juris-
diction of the Supreme Court by writ of error to, or by appeal
from, the Circuit Courts of Appeals. The effect of the new
Act is to change all this jurisdiction from the obligatory to the
certiorari and certificate class.
3rd. Under the prior law, cases from the Supreme Courts of
Hawaii and Porto Rico presenting questions similar to those
which were reviewable in the Supreme Court whdn removed
from state courts of last resort, and in some constitutional and
other cases from the District Court of Alaska, were embraced in
the direct and obligatory appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court. These are now by the new Act first to be reviewed in
the proper Circuit Courts of Appeals and then only can reach
the Supreme Court by certiorari or certificate.
4th. Under the prior law, a final judgment or decree of a
state court of last resort in a case in which is drawn in ques-
tion an authority exercised under the United States, and in which
the decision is against its validity, or where is drawn in ques-
tion an authority exercised under a state, on the ground of its
being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the
United States, and the decision is in favor of its validity, might
be reexamined in the Supreme Court upon a writ of error. By
the new Act these two classes of cases are removed from the
obligatory to the certiorari jurisdiction, a change which makes
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for clarity, because the question whether a case presented an
issue as to the validity of an authority under the United States
or under a State, was not free from difficulty of determination.
5th. Under the prior law, decrees and judgments of the
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia in cases presenting
questions of jurisdiction of the trial court, in prize cases, in
cases involving application or construction of the Federal Con-
stitution, the validity of any treaty or law oi the United States,
the validity of any State constitution or statute, the validity of
any authority exercised under the United States, or the existence
or scope of the power or duty of an officer of the United States,
and in cases in which the construction of any statute of the
United States was questioned, were reviewable by writ of error
or appeal in the Supreme Court. By the new Act such cases are
transferred from its obligatory appellate jurisdiction to that by
certiorari or certificate.
6th. Under the prior law, all claims decided in the Court of
Claims against the United States, of whatever amount, and all
claims involving more than $3,000, and decided against a claim-
ant, were reviewable by appeal in the Supreme Court. All cases
decided in the Court of Claims, of whatever amount, are put by
the new Act in the certiorari and certificate classes.
7th. There were a few bankruptcy cases, appeals to the Su-
preme Court from other courts than the Circuit Courts of Ap-
peals, under prior law which are brought by the new Act into
the certiorari class.
This list, describing reviewable cases in the Supreme Court
thus transferred from the obligatory to the discretionary class,
is on its face a formidable one; but their actual number will
not be so large as their description may suggest. It is to be
noted of course that the addition to the certiorari class does not
reduce pro tanto the cases to be considered on the merits by the
Court. Experience shows that from fifteen to twenty per cent
of applications for certiorari are granted. It remains to be seen
whether eighty per cent of the cases transferred to the certiorari
class by the new Act will be a sufficient reduction of its docket
to enable the Court gradually to catch up with its workc. We
hope so.
The review of cases by certificate of questions to the Supreme
Court has been somewhat increased by the new Act, but this is
not likely to be burdensome because the exceptional cases in
which it will be used would probably be admitted on certiorari,
if not on certificate.
The opinion has been expressed that this new Act will so in-
crease the business in the Circuit Courts of Appeals that addi-
tional judges in that Court may be necessary. Those courts have
been successful in keeping abreast of their dockets, and it would
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be too bad to clog them in an effort to relieve the Supreme Court.
I venture to doubt the fears expressed on this head.
The Act does add to the review by Circuit Courts of Appeals.
1st, That of interlocutory orders on motions to wind up a pend-
ing receivership or to take appropriate steps to accomplish the
purposes thereof such as a sale or other disposal of property
held thereunder.
2nd, Cases, already referred to, involving questions of juris-
diction of the District Courts, and those involving questions of
Federal constitutional or treaty construction, which under the
:prior law could be carried by a short cut to the Supreme Court,
but must now go to the Circuit Court of Appeals.
3rd, Cases of claims against the United States under the
Tucker Act, which formerly went directly to the Supreme Court,
but now go to the Circuit Courts of Appeals.
4th, The requirement that a Circuit and two District Judges
shall as a three-judge district court hear applications for tem-
porary injunctions to prevent enforcement of a state statute or
the order of a State Board, has now been broadened so that the
same number and kind of judges will have to pass on the final
hearing in such cases. This will in effect increase the burden on
judges of the Circuit Courts of Appeals.
In spite of all this, those courts have their dockets so well in
hand that I think the increase, provided at the last Congress,
of two Circuit Judges to make six in the Eighth Circuit, a pro-
posed and probable increase of one Circuit Judge to make four in
the Second Circuit, and possibly one in the Sixth Circuit are all
that are needed to enable the nine Circuit Courts of Appeals to
continue to see their dockets cleared before each summer vacation.
By the new Act, applications for review of cases in all courts
must be made in three months after final judgment, with the
exception of that for certiorari in the Philippine Islands, for
which six months is required. Theretofore six months was per-
mitted in review of cases from the District Courts in Circuit
Courts of Appeals. A justice of the Supreme Court may for
good cause shown extend the time of applying for a certiorari
in that Court sixty days.
The Act contains useful remedial provisions, as for instance
that errors as to forms of review, whether by writ of error or
appeals in all Federal Courts are to be disregarded, and a mistake
in applying to the Supreme Court for review by writ of error
from a state court of last resort when the application should have
been for certiorari, may be treated as such. Another is that
where the power to review either in the Circuit Courts of Ap-
peals or the Supreme Court depends upon the value of the thing
in controversy, and it is not disclosed, it may be shown by the
oath of a party or other competent evidence. Another is that
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in a suit by or against any officers of the United States, or of
the District of Columbia, or any territory or dependency, the
cause may be continued and retained against the successor in
office, if there be a substantial need for so continuing it; and
the same provision is made where an action brought by or
against an officer, a state or county, or a governmental agency
of the State is pending in a court of the United States, and the
officer dies, or is separated from office. In that case the suc-
cessor of such officer may be made a party after reasonable
notice and an opportunity to make any objection which he may
have.
Consideration of questions of jurisdiction in litigation in the
Federal Courts is of primary importance to the practitioner. In
every state court jurisdiction is a condition precedent to reme-
dial action, but in courts of so-called general jurisdiction, like the
courts of first instance of the States, their jurisdiction is usually
so broad that little time is spent on questions of jurisdiction of
the person or of the subject matter, if the parties are in court.
In the Federal Courts it is not so. Their jurisdiction is some-
thing exceptional, carved out by the Federal Constitution and
statutes of the sum total of judicial power of the States as it
was before the Revolution, and favorable presumptions of its
existence do not obtain in any direct proceeding of review. A
complaining litigant in the Federal courts finds a constant chal-
lenge to his right to be there and must always be ready to point
to the clause of the Federal Constitution and the statute by which
he may rightly invoke the consideration of the court. This bur-
den follows him clear through to the Supreme Court. Too often
a counsel fails to appreciate that at once upon beginning his
argument he must establish not only the jurisdiction of the court
of first instance but the Supreme Court's jurisdiction of the par-
ticular appellate proceeding by which he is undertaking to reverse
the lower court. The opening argument too often loses its force
and sequence because of counsel's unreadiness to comply with
the imperative insistence of the court in this regard. Excited
and interested in the merits, he finds himself tangled with juris-
dictional questions from the court which he has neglected in
preparation. But even when he has done as much as he can do
in this way, he has found difficulty in the language and structure
of the Act of 1891 and its numerous amendments. It is to be
hoped that the present Act is clearer and simpler.
I observe that one commentator on the new Act thinks it would
have been better to have had a complete revision of the whole
Judicial Code. Doubtless it would have been better, but such a
revision without a corps of assistants, whose time should be ex-
clusively devoted to it, would have been beyond the capacity of
the Court with its regular duties to perform. The result now is
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that the new Act covers within its sections the entire appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, with the exception of that of
the Court of Customs Appeals contained in an amendment to a
section of the Judicial Code. The new Act will certainly save
to the practitioner a great deal of anxious search for recent
and fugitive amendments of the appellate procedure.
Passage of the new Act has prompted the Court to revise and
amplify its rules. No such thorough revision has ever been
had in the history of the Court. The Committee which re-
vised the Rules was the same Committee, with Mr. Justice Van
Devanter at its head, which prepared the new Act. The Court
is anxious that the Bar shall be as well advised as possible of
the changes in the law and of the consequent changes in the
Rules. A new pamphlet containing the Rules and the new Act
has been printed, and can be had by practitioners upon applica-
tion to the Clerk of the Supreme Court.
A question has been under consideration by the Court as to
whether it would be practical to give oral hearings to applications
for certioraris. The changes in the new Act will doubtless in-
crease the number of these applications, and if the Court could
be relieved by short oral statements of the burden of close exam-
ination of briefs and records, it might help its disposition of the
business and at the same time give assurance to counsel of the
fact, which seems sometimes to have been doubted, that the full
Court seriously considers every application for a certiorari and
votes upon it as a real issue to be judicially determined. If there
are to be five hundred applications for certiorari a year (a con-
servative estimate), and ten minutes should be allowed to a side,
this would consume, if all the applications were orally presented
and opposed, eight weeks of the oral sessions of the Court. The
Court gives about eighteen weeks to oral sessions during an
annual term, so that it would take a little less than one-half of
the oral sessions devoted by the Court to argument. Of course
it is suggested that even if argument were permitted, advantage
would not be taken in many cases in which briefs would be solely
relied on. An experiment of a week or two at the beginning
of the term might possibly enable the Court to judge more
safely as to this. I fear, however, that the experiment would
show to be true what Senator Cummins said upon the floor of
the Senate, when it was proposed to require oral hearings of
certiorari applications, that we might just as well not pass the
law at all.
The Bar and the Court will await with very great interest the
result of two years'- operation under the Act. There are now so
many cases on the docket which came up under the prior law that
possibly a year should elapse before the real effect of the new
law can be judged.
